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THE COURT OP APPEALS, 1934 TERM
CRIMINAL LAW
Grand Jury
The New York Code of Criminal Procedure' provides that a Grand Jury may
indict if acting upon evidence that would be sufficient if unexplained or uncontra-
dicted to warrant a conviction.2 In People v. Donahue3 the Court held that the
evidence contained in the Grand Jury minutes, to the effect that defendant's accom-
plice actually effected an entry into the burglarized premises after all its doors and
windows had been locked and that he handed stolen merchandise through the door
to the defendant, was sufficient to sustain a charge of Burglary.4 Defendant's claim
that he did not intend to commit a theft would therefore have to wait the decision
of a jury.
Attorney-Client Privilege
In a prosecution for robbery in the first degree, defendant after taking the
stand in his own behalf was cross-examined about his conversations with his attor-
ney concerning the whereabouts of a girl involved in his defense. The questions
were admitted by the trial court over objection, on the ground that the defendant,
by taking the stand in his own behalf, had waived the right to avoid these ques-
tions. The conviction was reversed and a new trial was granted.5
Defendant, accused of being the "get-away" man for a group of men arrested
in the course of a robbery, contended that he was at the scene of the crime for
the purpose of keeping a date with a girl known only as "Doris." Doris' where-
abouts was not known to the prosecution and she had not been called as a witness
by the defense prior to the defendant's appearance on the stand. In the course of
cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor asked if the defendant had
told his attorney where Doris could be located, or whether his attorney had ever
told him not to contact her. Defense counsel objected, but the objection was over-
ruled.0 He then solicited the aid of the court in securing Doris Davis, the young
lady in question. This action was taken because the defense was, in the words of
1. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §258.
2. People v. Galbo, 218 N. Y. 283, 112 N. E. 1041 (1916); People v. To7and,
217 N. Y. 187, 111 N. E. 760 (1916).
3. 309 N. Y. 6, 127 N. E. 2d 725 (1955).
4. N. Y. PENAL LAW §404, subd. 1.
5. People v. Shapiro, 308 N. Y. 453, 126 N. E. 2d 559 (1955).
6. The exact wording of the trial court's ruling was: "Let me inform you
that when you take the witness stand to testify, you are the same as any other
witness. If you didn't want to take the witness stand, nobody could have com-
pelled you to take the stand, but when you take the witness stand, then you
answer .all questions that are put to you; is that clear to you?"12 308 N. Y. at
457, 126 N. E. 2d at 561.
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the Court of Appeals, "faced with the dilemma created by this line of questioning."7
The testimony of Miss Davis contradicted that of the defendant in many important
details, and did much to demolish the defense.
The right of a defendant in a criminal action not to take the stand is set
forth in both the Federal and State Constitutions.8 When he voluntarily takes the
stand, though, he waives his privilege against self-incrimination and subjects
himself to the same rules as all witnesses.9 The privilege of confidential communi-
cations between a lawyer and his client, however, is a separate and distinct one,
which applies whether the action is civil or criminal, and whether the witness is
or is not a party to the action. It is established by the rules of evidence in the
Civil Practice Act.'0 It is the privilege of the client only," and can be waived
only expressly or by voluntarily testifying about the privileged matter.
12
The Court of Appeals held that it goes beyond the grounds of basic fairness
to maintain that a privileged communication is waived when a defendant takes
the stand in a criminal case. The defendant in the instant case protested against
the questions, and his attorney interposed specific objections to them. Only under
judicial direction did he answer the questions on these communications. The
court stated that it was dearly error to infer a waiver from the fact of the defend-
ants taking the stand in his own behalf.
The dissent, while admitting that the privilege may have been violated,
claimed that the error was not prejudiccial to the defendant. His answer to each of
the questions was either in the negative or "I don't know." Therefore, argued the
dissent, it is difficult to see exactly how the defendant was harmed by being re-
quired to answer the questions.
While on the face of the facts as they appear in the Court's opinion the
dissent seems to have a valid rationale, two policy considerations militate in favor
of the majority. First, not all prejudice appears in the nature of the defendant's
replies to the questions. The exact causal relationship of these questions to the
calling of Miss Davis as a witness is not apparent from the case, but the Court
indicates that such a relationship is present. Furthermore, the implied accusation
in the questions that the defendant was deliberately concealing Miss Davis was
7. Ibid.
8. U. S. CONST. amend. V; N. Y. CONST. art. I, §6. See also N. Y. CODE CalM.
PROC., §10.
9. People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 494 (1892); People 'V. Trybus, 219
N. Y. 18, 113 N. E. 538 (1916); People v. Russo, 251 App. Dlv. 176, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 457 (1st Dep't 1937).
10. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT §353.
11. Id. §354.
12. People v. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131, 74 N. E. 843 (1905).
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certainly damaging. Secondly, the unprecedented use of the waiver of self-incrim-
ination as a waiver of the protection of the rules of evidence is so dangerous to
our basic policy of a fair trial for everydefendant that it is wise to put aside all
other considerations in striking down this principle before it gains any momentum.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In New York it has consistently been held that when a Grand Jury subpoenaed
a witness without apprizing him of his privilege against self-incrimination, and it
could reasonably be said that he was the target of the investigation, then his status
as a prospective defendant would be sufficient to confer automatic immunity upon
him with regard to testimony which might tend to incriminate him.13 It would
appear that the resulting conferral, perhaps unwittingly,1 4 of an "immunity bath"
prompted the enactment of Penal Law §2447,15 which holds that to obtain any
immunity the witness must 1) claim his privilege, 2) be directed to answer, and
3) testify.
In People v. De Feo,16 the prospective defendant was subpoenaed three
times before the Grand Jury without being informed of his privilege, and was
interrogated in regard to the alleged bribery of union officials. Before his fourth
appearance he was informed of the privilege and invoked it, and the Grand Jury
attempted to confer upon him a qualified immunity for "crimes of conspiracy
and bribing labor officials." In a subsequent trial for contempt, defendant's evasive
answers17 were held to amount to contumacious conduct by the trial court; the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under these circumstances it would be a
violation of defendant's Constitutional privilege against self incrimination' s to
base any indictment on his testimony.
The Court felt that requiring the witness to invoke the privilege when he
had not been put on notice that he was likely to be the target of the investigation
was in itself unconstitutional, and that the attempted conferal of a qualified
immunity at his fourth appearance did not meet the requirement that the immun-
13. People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 947
(2qJ Dep't 1940); People v. Cahill, 193 N. Y. 239, 86 N. E. 39 (1908); People v.
Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427,14 N. E. 319 (1887).
14. NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 1953, at 480.
15. . . .if a person refuses to answer a question . . .and . an order
is made that . . . (he) answer the question .. . (he) shall comply with the
order. If . t. . (he) complies.., and ifL but for this section, he would have been
privileged to withhold the answer ... then immunity shall be conferred upon
him..."
16. 308 N. Y. 595, 127 N. E. 2d 592 (1954).
17, Finkel 'v. Mq Cook, 247 App. Div. 52, 286 N. Y. Supp. 755 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 271 N. Y. 636, 3 N. E. 2d 460 (1936).
18. N. Y. CONsT. art. I §6.
